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Previous studies, by relying on nationally representative surveys, have overlooked the important fact
that use of addictive substances is not uniformly distributed; subgroups of hardcore users account
for most of the drug consumption. This study employs the Drug Use Forecasting system to analyze
the demand for cocaine and heroin by arrestees, employing objective indicators of use based on
urinalysis. The data are repeated city cross-sections, and panel data methodologies are employed to
control for policy endogeneity. Cocaine and heroin prices have a negative effect on the probability
of use even among this group of heavy users. Results indicate that subjective, self-reported measures
of participation are likely to be under-reported, which may impart bias to estimates of the price
elasticity. The own-price cocaine participation elasticity is about  n0.17, and the own-price heroin
participation elasticity is about  n0.09 for arrestees. This contemporaneous elasticity understates the
full effect, and the long-run price elasticity is about twice the magnitude. Estimated cross-price
elasticities indicate that cocaine and heroin are economic complements. While these findings show
that higher penalties, enforcement, and supply reduction activities can discourage participation by
heavy users, the elasticities are smaller in magnitude relative to the estimates in the prior literature.
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The U.S. federal government spends approximately $19 billion a year on drug control 
activities (Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2003).
1  The portion of this budget allocated 
towards demand reduction, including treatment and prevention, has remained relatively stable 
over the past 15 years at around 31 %.  Much of current drug control policy in the United States, 
however, focuses on supply-reduction programs aimed at stopping the flow of drugs and 
apprehending and punishing drug offenders.  From an economic perspective, such drug 
enforcement, by raising the cost of supplying drugs to the U.S. market, acts as a non-monetary 
tax and increases the transaction price of drugs.
2  By the law of the downward-sloping demand 
function, the increase in price must reduce the consumption of illicit drugs.  Hence, a critical 
question concerns the extent to which drug use responds to prices, especially heavy or 
problematic use.  Since manipulating prices is one instrument of control that the public sector 
can exercise on the market for addictive unhealthy substances, empirical estimates of the relation 
between price variations and illicit drug consumption are key to informing and shaping public 
policy. 
  This paper estimates the empirical relationship between the prices of cocaine and heroin 
and objective indicators of their use.  Cocaine and heroin prices are computed from the System 
to Retrieve Drug Evidence (STRIDE), comprised of purchases made by Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) agents during undercover operations.  The set of outcomes is the 
percentage of arrestees testing positive for each substance, derived from the Drug Use 
                                                 
1 State and local spending on drug control amounted to an additional $16 billion in 2000. 
2 Costs for drug suppliers increase because: 1) they are forced to use underground distribution 
and transportation channels that can be hidden from authorities, 2) some drug shipments are 







Forecasting (DUF) program.   Panel data methodologies are used to identify the empirical link 
between cocaine and heroin prices and these indicators of use. 
  While this study is related to the new and growing empirical literature dealing with the 
price sensitivity of illegal drug consumption, it improves upon the prior estimates in a number of 
ways.  The illegal drug use indicators employed in much of the literature are based on self-
reports and may be measured inaccurately.  This is especially true for heroin use, which is 
virtually non-existent in national surveys.
3  In contrast, the indicators used in the present study 
are objective measures of cocaine and heroin participation, obtained via urinalysis.
4  Moreover, 
much of the literature, by relying on self-reported national surveys, does not consider 
consumption by certain subgroups like the homeless or arrestees, who may behave very 
differently from the population at large.  The persons sampled in DUF are not representative of 
the general population.  In particular, the focus is on persons arrested for any offense. These 
individuals are much more likely to be hardcore users of drugs than an individual selected at 
random.  Thus, they also impose the heaviest costs on society and are the target of much illegal 
drug policy.  Drug use trends based on national surveys may also paint an incomplete picture.  
For instance, results from the National Household Surveys of Drug Abuse show that past month 
illicit drug use declined steadily from 14.1 % in 1979 to 6.2 % in 1998.  In contrast, more 
objective indicators of heavy drug consumption show an opposite trend.  For instance, drug-
related hospital emergency department episodes increased from 145 (per 100,000 people) in 
1978 to 230 in 2001.   There were a total of 19,698 deaths from drug-induced causes in 2000, an 
                                                                                                                                                             
or other relatively costly methods to enforce their contracts rather than use the court system, 
and 4) because of fines and imprisonment.  
3 Less than 0.1 percent of the sample reported current heroin use in the 2002 National Survey 







increase of 177 % from 1981.  In 2000, the overall cost of drug abuse to society was estimated at 
$161 billion, an increase of almost 60 % from 1992.  These trends suggest that while casual drug 
use may be declining, use among heavy consumers on the other tail of the distribution may be 
rising.      
  Many studies based on survey data also rely on the respondent’s state of residence as the 
geographic unit.  Consequently, when estimating the price elasticity of demand, these researchers 
have had to employ a state-average price despite the fact that there is considerable inter-city 
variation in drug prices even within a given state.  This measurement error may lead to biased 
estimates.  The present study overcomes this limitation by computing and merging drug prices at 
the city level.  This analysis further exploits the time-series of city cross sections and estimates 
various fixed-effects specifications to control for unmeasured factors that may be correlated with 
price and consumption.  In addition, lagged and lead price series are used in the context of panel 
data techniques to inform on the possibility of policy endogeneity.  Another deficiency in the 
existing literature concerns cross price elasticities of demand.  There are very few studies that 
analyze the effects of changes in the price of one drug on the consumption of another, and so 
estimates of these cross-price effects are limited.  The present study estimates whether heroin 
and cocaine are substitutes or complements using the aforementioned objective drug use 
outcomes.   
  The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 reviews prior empirical 
studies dealing with the price sensitivity of the consumption of illegal drugs.  Section 3 describes 
the data assembled for use in this study.  Section 4 outlines the analytical models that guide the 
                                                                                                                                                             
4 Arrestees are also asked to report on their own drug use.  Comparing these self-reports to the 







empirical specifications.  Section 5 discusses the econometric strategy for estimating the models.  
Section 6 presents the price elasticities of demand for arrestees.  Section 7 discusses these results 
and offers some concluding remarks. 
2. Prior  Studies 
  An editorial in Drug and Alcohol Review (1999) stated that while economics has a 
critical influence in the development of policies in other areas, “illicit drugs is one of the few 
remaining areas yet to be significantly influenced by advances in this discipline.”  Yet, there is a 
rapidly growing empirical literature by economists dealing with the price sensitivity of 
consumption of illegal drugs.
5  The inherent difficulty of measuring consumption and price of an 
activity that does not enter the official market is apparent.  These demand studies primarily draw 
on illegal drug prices derived from local purchases made by drug enforcement agents while 
undercover.  The studies typically combine these prices with self-reported measures of drug use 
from such national surveys as the National Household Survey of Drug Abuse and Monitoring the 
Future.  The outcomes employed in these analyses are usually self-reported past year or past 
month participation and frequency of use given positive participation.   
  The early conventional view that the demand for addictive substances, such as illicit 
drugs, did not respond to price was increasingly challenged by subsequent studies.  Silverman 
and Spruill (1977) implicitly estimate the long-run price elasticity of demand for heroin at –0.25, 
based on monthly aggregated data for 41 poor, non-white Detroit communities from November 
1970 to July 1973.  Van Ours (1995) analyzes data on opium consumption and the number of 
                                                 
5 Economists have also studied various issues concerning the current policy towards illicit drugs 
versus a regime where drugs are legalized.  See, for example, MacCoun and Reuter (2001), 








opium users in the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) for the period 1923 to 1938.  He estimates 
a short-run price elasticity of demand of –0.70 and a long-run price elasticity of demand of –
1.00.  Bretteville-Jensen and Sutton (1996) estimate the price-responsiveness for heroin to be –
1.23, based on a sample of non-dealing heroin users who participated in a needle exchange 
program in Oslo, Norway. 
  Several authors, in more recent studies, have estimated price elasticities using national 
survey data.  Grossman and Chaloupka (1998) analyze the demand for cocaine by young adults 
(ages 17-29) in the Monitoring the Future (MTF) panels using the rational addiction framework.  
The data employed in their study consists of panels formed from nationally representative cross-
sectional surveys of high school seniors conducted between 1976 and 1985, with the last follow-
up conducted in 1989.  Grossman and Chaloupka find that annual participation and frequency of 
use given positive participation respond negatively to the price of cocaine.  The long-run price 
elasticity of participation is estimated at –1.00, and the long-run price elasticity of frequency 
given participation is estimated at –0.35.  They also find that current consumption is positively 
affected by past consumption, consistent with the hypothesis that cocaine is an addictive good, 
and also positively affected by future consumption, consistent with the rational addiction model. 
  Chaloupka, Grossman, and Tauras (1999) estimate cocaine price elasticities for past 
month and past year outcomes based on the 1982 and 1989 MTF cross-sectional surveys of high 
school seniors.  Their results indicate a price elasticity of past-year participation of –0.89 and an 
elasticity of past-month participation of –0.98.  The corresponding frequency elasticities are –
0.40 and –0.45 respectively.  However, DiNardo (1993) finds that past-month participation by 







Based on pooled data from the 1988, 1990, and 1991 National Household Surveys of 
Drug Abuse (NHSDA), Saffer and Chaloupka (1999a) estimate models for all ages.  They find 
that the annual participation price elasticity for cocaine is –0.55 and that for heroin is –0.90.  
Monthly participation price elasticities for cocaine and heroin are –0.80 and –0.36 respectively.  
Using the same sample, Saffer and Chaloupka (1999b) estimate these price elasticities separately 
for demographic subgroups.  They find that the cocaine price elasticity is insignificant for blacks 
and Asians, -1.83 for Native Americans, and between –0.5 and –0.8 for white males, Hispanics, 
women, and youth.  For heroin, the price elasticity is estimated at –1.63 for white males, -0.62 
for females, -0.36 for youth, and close to zero for all others.  DeSimone and Farrely (2001) 
analyze data from 1990-1997 NHSDA.  They estimate a past-year cocaine participation elasticity 
of –0.41 for individuals between the ages of 18 to 39.  However, similar models for persons ages 
12 to 17 do not yield significantly negative price effects.  
While the weight of the evidence from these studies suggests that cocaine and heroin use 
do respond negatively to price, there is little consensus about the magnitudes of the own-price 
elasticities.  Studies that investigate the cross-price responsiveness of various illicit substances 
are sparse.  Saffer and Chaloupka (1999a, 1999b), based on NHSDA data, estimate demand 
functions for cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and alcohol that contain the money price of each 
substance except marijuana.  Their results show that these substances are economic 
complements, such that an increase in the price of one decreases the consumption of all others. 
The illegal drug use indicators in the studies just cited may be plagued by inaccuracies if 








6 Caulkins (1996) indirectly estimates cocaine and heroin participation price 
elasticities based on data from 1987 to 1991 for 24 cities represented in Drug Use Forecasting 
(DUF).  He uses as outcomes the percentages of persons arrested and brought to booking 
facilities who tested positive for cocaine and heroin based on urine specimens.  His price 
elasticity estimates are -0.39 for cocaine and -0.28 for heroin, for arrestees.  Invoking 
assumptions concerning the fraction of drug users testing positive and arrests attributable to drug 
use, other causes, and drug spending, Caulkins imputes general participation price elasticities 
that are very large in absolute magnitude: -2.5 for cocaine and -1.5 for heroin.  His models do not 
control for time trends.  Furthermore, the city-level drug price is treated as endogenous and 
instrumented with the national price.  Hence, the results reflect time-series variation between 
prices and the drug use outcomes.  The models also do not control for any other variables that 
may have changed over time. 
Crane, Rivolo, and Comfort (1997) employ aggregate time series from DUF in order to 
estimate the price elasticity of demand for cocaine ranging from -0.29 to -0.63.  This study also 
fails to control for time trends.  Hyatt and Rhodes (1995) find that cocaine price is negatively 
related to the fraction of arrestees testing positive for cocaine, from DUF.  While this study adds 
city indicators to control for unobserved factors at the city level, it also does not control for time 
                                                 
6 Since drug use is significantly higher among respondents who live in households considered 
unstable, the NHSDA’s bias towards sampling stable households is likely to overlook many 
heavy drug users.  Many studies have documented that respondents in the NHSDA understate 
heavy drug use.  The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Administration (SAMHSA) reports 
that virtually no heroin addicts respond in the NHSDA.  A comparison of heavy cocaine users in 
the NHSDA with those in other sources shows a marked difference with respect to demographic 
characteristics.  In the NHSDA, incomes are higher, unemployment is lower, and fewer 
respondents report using more than one drug.  Estimates of heavy drug use reported in the 
NHSDA are also difficult to reconcile with other data sources maintained by SAMHSA.  See 







trends or any other factors that may have shifted over time.  Furthermore, the price of cocaine is 
not adjusted for inflation.  Since year indicators are not included, this leads to biased estimates. 
All of these studies which employ DUF to measure the price responsiveness of cocaine 
and heroin estimate models that are misspecified due to lack of adequate controls.  They also fail 
to check or control for the possibility that policies which affect drug prices may themselves be 
endogenous to the drug use outcomes.  As a result, it is difficult to ascertain from these studies 
whether the negative correlation between the outcomes and price represents a true causal effect 
or whether it reflects a spurious correlation due to other unobserved factors.  The specifications 
in this study include a full set of city and time indicators and interactions between city indicators 
and linear trends, along with various socio-economic variables, to control for unmeasured factors 
that may be simultaneously correlated with price and consumption.  A first-differenced 
instrumental variables procedure is also implemented to account for potential endogeneity.  None 
of the studies reviewed has combined this fixed-effects methodology with objective measures of 
drug use.   
3. Data 
  The empirical work is based on objective outcomes related to cocaine and heroin 
consumption derived from the Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) program.  The DUF program, which 
is maintained by the National Institute of Justice, was established in 1987 to investigate the level 
of drug use among booked arrestees in urban areas.
7  Adults, 16 years of age and older, who are 
arrested and brought to booking facilities in several cities across the U.S. are interviewed on a 
voluntary basis, within 48 hours of their arrest, and asked to provide urine specimens.  The 







interviewed, while 80 % of them agree to provide urine specimens.  There are no marked 
differences between arrestees who agree and those who refuse to be interviewed with respect to 
ethnicity, age, gender, race, employment, or reason for arrest (Chaiken and Chaiken, 1992).  
Urine specimens are collected immediately after the interview and screening for various 
substances is conducted off-site.  Urinalysis can generally detect the use of drugs within the past 
48 to 72 hours. 
  While DUF does not sample all arrestees brought to booking facilities, Hunt and Rhodes 
(2001) suggest that it is reasonable to use the DUF sample to draw inferences about the general 
arrestee population.  Moreover, Rhodes and McDonald (1991) estimated that in 1989 the DUF 
sample accounted for 90 % of cocaine consumption and virtually all of the heroin consumption 
in the U.S.  While these figures should be interpreted with care, it is apparent that the population 
sampled by DUF includes more hardcore drug users.  Because users involved in the criminal 
justice system account for the majority of drugs consumed, the overall elasticities of the drugs 
may be dominated by the price responsiveness of this sub-population (Caulkins, 2001).  The data 
used in the present study are annual aggregates from 39 large cities for the period 1988 to 2000.
8  
Until 1997, the DUF program collected information in 24 cities across the United States, 
although the number of sites varies from year to year.  In 1998 the program was expanded to 
more cities, and a redesigned sampling frame based on probability based sampling of the adult 
                                                                                                                                                             
7 See Hunt and Rhodes (2001) for a detailed description of the DUF program. 
8 The DUF cities are New York City, Washington D.C., Portland, San Diego, Indianapolis, 
Houston, Ft. Lauderdale, Detroit, New Orleans, Phoenix, Chicago, Los Angeles, Dallas, 
Birmingham, Omaha, Philadelphia, Miami, Cleveland, San Antonio, St. Louis, Kansas City, San 
Jose, Denver, Atlanta, Albuquerque, Minneapolis, Sacramento, Tucson, Anchorage, Des 
Moines, Laredo, Las Vegas, Oklahoma City, Salt Lake City, Seattle, Spokane, Honolulu, 







male population was fully implemented in 2000; it is currently the Arrestee Drug Abuse 
Monitoring system.
9     
  Results from urinalysis are used to compute the percentage of arrestees in each city 
testing positive for cocaine and the percentage testing positive for heroin.
10  Approximately 40 % 
of arrestees tested positive for cocaine in the sample, and approximately eight percent tested 
positive for heroin.  In addition to the urine tests, respondents are also asked to report on their 
own drug use.  Based on self-reports, variables measuring the percentage of arrestees who 
admitted using cocaine or heroin in the past 72 hours are also created.  About 21 % of the 
arrestees reported using cocaine in the past 72 hours, and five percent reported using heroin.  
These figures show the extent of under-reporting in these self-reports.  The arrestees are also 
asked to report whether they used cocaine and heroin in the past 30 days and the mean number of 
days that each drug was used.  From these questions, variables measuring the percentage of 
arrestees reporting cocaine and heroin participation in the past 30 days and the mean number of 
days in each city that cocaine and heroin were consumed by users are created.  About 28 % 
reported past month cocaine participation, and about six percent reported past month heroin 
participation.  Conditional on positive participation, cocaine was used on about 23 days and 
heroin was used on about 17 days in the past month.  Even from these self-reports, it is evident 
that the sample in DUF is more representative of the heavy users.  For instance, based on the 
NHSDA in 1995, the average cocaine user consumed cocaine on 12 days and the average heroin 
                                                 
9 Restricting the data from 1988 to 1997 or deleting observations for the year 2000 does not 
affect the results.  Models that include the number of arrestees in the DUF sample as a fraction 
of total arrests are estimated to account for the change in the sampling frame.  Year effects will 
capture any other breaks in the data that have occurred over time.     
10 Urinalysis tests for all opiates instead of heroin specifically.  While heroin is the most 








user consumed heroin on six days in the past month.  Means for the DUF sample are presented in 
Table 1.      
  Additional covariates are also defined based on the individual arrestee data.  These 
include the percent of arrestees in each MSA who are male, Black, other race, Hispanic, ages 16 
to 24, ages 25 to 54, high school graduate, earned most of their income in the past month through 
full-time employment, are married, and whose most serious offense charge was drug-related.  
Since the outcomes are measured at the city or MSA level, additional MSA-level variables are 
created and included in all models.  Personal income per capita is derived from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis website and deflated by the national consumer price index reported by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics.  In order to capture local labor market conditions, the unemployment 
rate in each MSA is also included in all models.  Data on unemployment are obtained from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, and in some cases also calculated from the March supplements of the 
Current Population Survey.  Total MSA population is obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Census.   
  Indicators of local enforcement efforts are also appended to the DUF data set.
11  
Variables measuring the probability of arrest for drug possession and drug sale are computed 
from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting System.  Ideally, the probability of arrest is 
constructed by dividing the total number of arrests in each category by the total number of drug 
users and dealers in the MSA or some proxy for total drug activity.  However, as there are no 
reliable estimates of the number of drug users and dealers by MSA, the denominator is proxied 
by total MSA population and in some cases by the total number of arrests.  Variables measuring 







any drug-related violation, sale or trafficking in cocaine or opiates, and sale or trafficking in 
marijuana are used to create the corresponding arrest rates. 
  Data on cocaine and heroin prices are computed from purchases made by undercover 
drug enforcement agents.  Information on these purchases including cost, weight, and purity is 
recorded by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in their System to Retrieve Information from 
Drug Evidence (STRIDE).  The advantage of STRIDE’s transaction-level data is that they 
directly reflect prices on the street.  These prices are expected to be relatively accurate because 
any unreasonable price offer by a DEA agent may raise suspicion on the dealer’s part and 
endanger the agent.  However, because the transactions are of varying size and quality, the cost 
of each drug must be standardized. 
  Standardized prices of one pure gram of cocaine and heroin in a given metropolitan area 
for a given year are derived in the following manner: 
(1) Log  Costijt = π0 + π1 (log Predicted Purityijt  + log Weightijt) + π2j ∑ MSAj 
   +   π3t ∑ Yeart + π4jt ∑ MSAj * Yeart + υijt 
The subscripts denote the i
th transaction in the j
th MSA for year t.  Cost refers to the total cost of 
the purchase, weight is the total gram weight of the purchase, and purity is the weight of the pure 
drug found in the purchase as a fraction of the total purchase weight.  MSA and Year refer to 
dichotomous indicators of each, and MSA*Year refers to indicators of the interaction between 
the two.  Predicted Purity is obtained from a first-stage regression of actual purity on all of these 
other explanatory variables.  The price of one pure gram of the drug in MSA j for year t is then 
imputed as: 
                                                                                                                                                             
11 Data in the Uniform Crime Reports are available at the county level.  To obtain MSA-level 







(2) exp  (  π0 + π2j + π3t + π4jt ) . 
In the above procedure, purity is treated as endogenous because purchases may depend on 
expected rather than actual purity (Caulkins, 1994).  Identification is achieved by constraining 
the coefficient on predicted purity to equal that on weight in the second-stage regression.
12  In 
this study, price series based on purity treated as exogenous and estimating (1) with the 
coefficients unconstrained were experimented with in all models.  There are no material changes 
in the results or conclusions.   STRIDE data are available from 1974 to 2001, and all years are 
used to impute the price series for the periods represented in DUF.  Excluding outliers, there are 
93,784 cocaine transactions and 40,957 heroin transactions.
13   In order to maximize the sample 
size in subsequent estimation, prices that are missing in any given MSA for any given year are 
imputed by the mean of the prices for all other available MSA’s in that particular state.
14  Results 
are not sensitive to this imputation.  All price series are deflated by the national CPI.  The mean 
real price (in 1982-1984 dollars) of one pure gram of cocaine is $80.47.  The mean real heroin 
price is $490.18. 
  One of the advantages of this study is that the drug prices are computed and merged at 
the city level.  Many prior studies relying on national self-reported survey data used state-
                                                                                                                                                             
MSA.  Using state-level arrest variables does not materially affect results. 
12 Equation (1) can be justified by defining the price of one pure gram of drug as: 
Price = Cost / (Pure Quantity of Drug) 
π1 , where pure quantity is purity times total weight.  Here 
π1 captures any non-linear effects of quantity on price, for example due to quantity discounts.  In 
log-linear form, this is Log Price = Log Cost - π1 Log Purity - π1 Log Weight.  It is assumed that 
the standardized price varies between cities and over time.  Thus, Log Price = a + b MSA + c 
Year + d MSA*Year.  Substituting this expression in the log-linear formulation results in an 
estimable form, equation (1). 
13 Transactions used in the imputation have a purchase cost of at least one dollar (zero cost 
represents seizures and are thus excluded) and purity between zero and 100 %.  
14 This imputation is more relevant for heroin prices due to more missing data; about eight 
percent of the DUF sample are affected by this imputation.  For cocaine, a little over one 







average prices despite the fact that drug prices seem to vary widely from city to city.  Granted 
that there may still be substantial intra-city variation in drug prices at any given time, the 
measurement error is likely to be much smaller than with state-level prices.   
Kuziemko and Levitt (2001) find that STRIDE cocaine prices from 1986 through 1996 
are positively related to state-level indicators of the certainty of punishment, measured by the per 
capita number of drug arrests, and the severity of punishment, measured by the fraction of drug 
arrests resulting in imprisonment.  These findings suggest that illicit drug prices are responsive to 
enforcement and apprehension, instruments of current drug control policy.  Basov, Jacobson, and 
Miron (2001) argue that due to the illicit, secretive nature of the drug trade, both production and 
sales are more labor intensive compared to legal markets.  Most of these jobs are also likely to be 
filled by low-skilled employees, youths, or others with fewer outside opportunities.  Their study 
shows that cocaine and heroin prices from STRIDE are positively related to the state-specific 
relative unskilled wage in a time series of states from 1974 to 1999.  These two studies confirm 
that DEA drug prices do indeed reflect costs of retailing including expected penalties associated 
with this activity and labor costs. 
4. Analytical  Framework 
  The objective of this study is to assess the extent to which outcomes related to cocaine 
and heroin consumption respond to cocaine and heroin prices.  Since illicit drugs are ultimately 
consumer goods, this question can be framed within the context of consumer theory and demand 
analysis.  The utility function can be reformulated to explicitly take account of the addictive 
aspects of illicit drugs.   







The individual’s current utility depends on current consumption of the addictive goods (A1 and 
A2), the non-addictive good (X), and also on the stock of the addictive goods (S1 and S2) 
accumulated through past consumption.  In addition to positive but diminishing marginal utility 
in A and X, the utility function also satisfies certain other restrictions.  First, the stocks of 
addictive consumption positively affect current marginal utility of the addictive goods.  This is 
the reinforcement effect by which past consumption of drugs stimulates current consumption. 
(4) UA1S1 = ∂2Ut / ∂A1t S1t  >  0 
(5) UA2S2 = ∂2Ut / ∂A2t S2t  >  0 
Second, the stocks of addictive consumption negatively affect current total utility.  This is the 
tolerance effect.  Higher past addictive consumption lowers current utility, and hence a greater 
amount of current addictive consumption is required to obtain a given level of total utility.  
Alternatively, this can also reflect harmful addiction since past consumption of drugs can lower 
current utility due to detrimental health effects. 
(6) US1 = ∂Ut / ∂S1t  <  0 
(7) US2 = ∂Ut / ∂S2t  <  0 
It is conceivable that there may also be cross-reinforcement effects so that the addictive stock of 
one drug may affect the current consumption of the other by affecting its current marginal utility. 
(8) UA1S2 = ∂2Ut / ∂A1t S2t  ≥  0 
(9) UA2S1 = ∂2Ut / ∂A2t S1t  ≥  0 
Maximizing the above utility function in every period subject to a basic budget constraint derives 
a demand function where current consumption of the addictive good (A1) is affected by its own 







individual’s age, gender, race, and education.  Current consumption also depends on the 
addictive stocks (S1 and S2).
15 
(10) At = α1 Pt + δ1 St + β1 It + β2 Yt + εt . 
(11) A1t = α1 P1t + α2 P2t + δ1 S1t + δ2 S2t + β1 It + β2 Yt + εt. 
The parameter δ1 is hypothesized to be greater than zero due to the positive reinforcement of past 
addictive consumption on current consumption.  This intertemporal complementarity between 
past and current consumption is the hallmark of economic models of addiction.
16  The own-price 
effect, α1, is hypothesized to be negative under the law of the downward sloping demand 
function.  The cross-price effect α2 is positive if the two drugs are economic substitutes, negative 
if they are economic complements, and zero if the two drugs are independent.  The cross-
reinforcement effect δ2 may be zero or positive.
17 
5. Empirical  Framework 
 In the model presented above, the key parameter of interest is α1, which quantifies the sensitivity 
of drug use to changes in its price.  In estimating the addictive demand functions (10) and (11), 
since the accumulated addictive stock is unobserved, it can be proxied by past consumption 
outcomes.  That is, 
(12) Sit = S (Ait-1) 
                                                 
15 Equation (10) is based on a utility function with one addictive substance. 
16 This model is referred to as myopic addiction in the literature.  Even though addiction is 
formulated explicitly through interactions between past and current consumption and has 
harmful effects in future periods, the individual is still myopic in that he is maximizing a single 
period utility function subject to a period budget constraint.  See Becker and Murphy (1988) for a 
model of rational addiction wherein the individual maximizes a lifetime utility function comprised 
of a summation of discounted period utilities, similar to that specified in (3). 
17 In contrast to a cross-reinforcement effect, a cross-dampening effect would mean that (8) and 
(9) are negative; that is, an increase in the addictive stock of one drug lowers the current 







Substituting (12) into (10) and (11) yields: 
(13)   At = α1 Pt + δ1 At-1 + β1 It + β2 Yt + εt 
(14) A1t = α1 P1t + α2 P2t + δ1 A1t-1 + δ2 A2t-1 + β1 It + β2 Yt + εt 
Estimating equations with lagged dependent variables presents many econometric hurdles 
discussed later.  Alternately, since demand in any period is a function of the price in that period, 
past consumption can be proxied by a series of past prices. With this substitution, the addictive 
demand functions can be formulated as: 
(15)   At = α1 Pt + λ1 Pt-1 + β1 It + β2 Yt + εt 
(16) A1t = α1 P1t + α2 P2t + λ 1 P1t-1 + λ 2 P2t-1 + β1 It + β2 Yt + εt 
Since past consumption stimulates current consumption due to the reinforcement effect, the 
coefficients of own-lagged prices are expected to be negative.  If there are cross-reinforcement 
effects, then the coefficients of cross-lagged prices are also expected to be negative.  Statistically 
significant lagged price effects thus present indirect evidence of the addictive aspects of heroin 
and cocaine. 
In this study, the addictive drugs considered are cocaine and heroin, and the set of 
outcomes from DUF is the percent of arrestees testing positive for cocaine or heroin use, which 
is a measure of the probability of participating in each drug.  As such, it is a direct proxy for an 
arrestee’s drug use. While the dependent variable is intended to measure a random arrestee’s 
probability of participating in cocaine or heroin, DUF does not sample all arrestees.  Therefore, 
(17) Prob  (Cocaine|Arrested)=Prob (Cocaine|DUF Arrestee)* Prob (DUF Arrestee|Arrested). 
In log-linear form, this becomes, 
                                                                                                                                                             
disrupt the flow of the neurotransmitter dopamine in order to produce feelings of pleasure and 







(18)  Log Prob (Cocaine | DUF Arrestee)  =  Log Prob (Cocaine | Arrested) –  
  Log Prob (DUF Arrestee | Arrested). 
The outcomes employed in this study are the percentage of DUF arrestees who tested positive for 
cocaine or heroin, that is Prob (Cocaine|DUF Arrestee).  Hunt and Rhodes (2001) note that 
inferences about the general arrestee population can be drawn from DUF.  Nevertheless, some 
models include the number of DUF arrestees in each MSA as a fraction of total arrests (from the 
Uniform Crime Reports) to proxy for the Prob (DUF Arrestee|Arrested) and to control for 
changes in sample design between DUF and ADAM. 
The data employed are a time-series of city cross-sections.
18  All regressions are 
estimated in logistic form, where the dependent variable is measured as the log of the odds ratio.  
Since the original outcomes are rates between zero and one, the logistic transformation ensures 
that the predicted rate or probability also lies in this range.
19  Panel-data techniques are employed 
to estimate the following models based on the above formulations: 
(19)   Log (Ait/1-Ait) = α1 Pit + λ1 Pit-1 + β1 Iit + β2 Yit + µi + ηt + νit 
(20) Log  (A1it/1-A1it) = α1 P1it + α2 P2it + λ 1 P1it-1 + λ 2 P2it-1 + β1 Iit + β2 Yit + µi+ ηt+ νit 
The subscripts denote the i
th MSA for year t.  Y represents the vector of observable determinants 
of demand, besides price and income, and is proxied by the unemployment rate, various MSA-
                                                 
18 Models are estimated with MSA-aggregated rates, based on individual data, for two reasons.  
First, cocaine and heroin prices, the key variables of interest, are measured and merged at the 
MSA level.  Thus, variation in drug use between individuals in a given MSA-year cell conditional 
on variation in MSA-level prices and other covariates is noise, and estimating models at the 
individual level will not add anything.  Dow et al. (2003) also note that aggregation can 
ameliorate bias when omitted variables vary more at the individual-level than at the community 
level.  This is likely the case in the present study where drug use is an individual behavioral 
choice affected by unobserved heterogeneity across individuals, and omitted community 
variables can be proxied with MSA effects and MSA-specific trends.     
19 The elasticity of participation with respect to price is calculated as α1 (1-A)P.  The marginal 







level socioeconomic characteristics, and drug-related arrest rates.  The disturbance is modeled 
with two-way error components where µi denotes the unobservable area fixed effects, ηt denotes 
the unobservable time effects, and νit is the remainder stochastic error term.  In an aggregated 
logistic regression, the variance of the error term is inversely proportional to Ait(1-Ait)nit 
(Maddala, 1983).  Thus, all models are weighted by Ait(1-Ait)nit to correct for the 
heteroscedasticity.  This formulation is followed in all estimations. 
  These fixed-effects procedures are inconsistent if city drug prices or the policies that 
determine them might depend on the level of substance use, or as is more likely the lagged level 
of substance use. This possibility is sometimes referred to as policy endogeneity.  There are two 
critical issues.  The first is that there is an unmeasured fixed effect that is correlated with right-
hand-side variables.  In the context of this research, the fixed effect may be city or state 
sentiment (e.g., religiosity) towards drug use that also influences drug prices and enforcement.  
The second issue is that price may be predetermined and not strictly exogenous because past 
shocks to drug use may be correlated with current prices.  Thus, current price is predetermined if 
it is uncorrelated with the current disturbance term but correlated with past disturbances. 
(21) E  (Pit νis) ≠ 0 for s < t  and  E (Pit νis) = 0 for s ≥ t 
Consider the addictive demand equation (19).  For convenience, LOit refers to Log (Ait/1-Ait), 
and the year effects and lagged effects are ignored. 
(19a) LOit = α1 Pit + β1 Iit + β2 Yit + µi + νit 
The area fixed effects can be removed by first differencing.
20 
                                                 
20 Fixed-effects estimation is equivalent to first-differencing if there are exactly two periods for 
each cross-section.  Otherwise, including fixed effects is equivalent to a regression where all 
observations are transformed to deviations from the mean, where the mean is calculated for 







(19b) LOit - LOit-1 = α1 (Pit - Pit-1) + β1 (Iit - Iit-1) + β2 (Yit - Yit-1) + (νit - νit-1) 
If price is predetermined then the orthogonality assumption is violated since Pit is correlated with 
νit-1.  The fixed-effects or first-differenced specification is no longer consistent. 
  In order to check for potential policy endogeneity, two informal tests are performed.  
First, following Model (1993), specifications with a series of lagged and leading prices are 
estimated.  If changes in drug outcomes are caused by changes in enforcement or prices as 
opposed to changes in prices being causes by these outcomes, then larger outcomes should not 
occur until after any decreases in price and vice versa.  In specifications with lagged and leading 
price series, only the coefficients on contemporaneous and lagged prices should be significant.  
The lead prices should be insignificant.  If the leading prices are significant, however, then this 
could be evidence of policy endogeneity.
21 
  A second informal test estimates specifications with various lagged enforcement 
variables to proxy for past shocks to demand that may also be affecting current prices.  Consider 
the baseline demand equation again, where the disturbance term is divided into two components. 
(19c) LOit = α1 Pit + β1 Iit + β2 Yit + µi + νit, where νit = ωit-1 + φit 
Thus, 
(19d) LOit - LOit-1 = α1 (Pit - Pit-1) + β1 (Iit - Iit-1) + β2 (Yit - Yit-1) + (ωit-1 - ωit -2) + 
  ( φit - φit -1) 
Here, φit is a pure stochastic disturbance term that is uncorrelated with all past, current, and 
future values of the explanatory variables.  However, ωit-1 represents unobserved shocks to past 
                                                 
21 Significant lead prices may also be construed as evidence of rational addiction.  However in 
the present context, it is unlikely that users are able to forecast drug prices far in advance, as 








demand that may also affect current prices, making price predetermined and statistically 
endogenous.  This endogeneity is similar to omitted variables bias in an intertemporal context, 
and the composite error   νit will also be serially correlated due to this omission.  In other words, 
there are unmeasured factors ω that simultaneously affect past demand and current prices.  
Conditional on ω, price is strictly exogenous with respect to the remainder disturbance term.  
Therefore, if variables measuring such shocks can be included in the models, then the 
coefficients on price can be analyzed to gauge the extent of such endogeneity.  Past enforcement 
efforts may proxy for these shocks to some extent.  For instance, higher arrest rates related to 
drug violations or sales may affect current drug consumption and also influence future drug 
prices.  If the price effects are robust in specifications that control for these lagged enforcement 
variables, then it is likely that price is not predetermined and may be regarded as strictly 
exogenous.  In addition, including city specific trends in the models may also control for some of 
these unobserved intertemporal shocks.      
The possibility that price is not strictly exogenous is also treated explicitly in the 
estimation of the demand function. 
(22) Log  (Ait/1-Ait)  = α1 Pit + δ1 Log (Ait-1/1-Ait-1) + β1 Iit + β2 Yit + µi + ηt + νit 
Earlier, past addictive consumption was substituted out with past prices in order to bypass the 
problems associated with lagged dependent variables.  The issues involved are very similar to 
those discussed above with predetermined covariates.  A first-differenced specification of (22) 
gets rid of the unobserved fixed effect but also shows that orthogonality between the explanatory 
variables and the disturbance term is violated. 







Note that LOit-1 is correlated with νit-1 (as is Pit if price is predetermined).  Arellano and Bond 
(1991) show that the orthogonality conditions in a dynamic panel data model can be exploited to 
obtain valid instruments for (LOit-1 - LOit-2).  Specifically, LOit-2 is a valid instrument, since it is 
highly correlated with (LOit-1 - LOit-2) and uncorrelated with (νit - νit-1) as long as the νit are not 
serially correlated.
22  In fact, following the same logic, all available lags of the dependent 
variable are valid instruments for (LOit-1-LOit-2), that is LOit-2, LOit-3, etc.  All levels (lagged and 
current) of the strictly exogenous variables are also valid instruments.
23 
  The Arellano-Bond estimator also allows for the possibility that one or more of the 
explanatory variables may be predetermined and endogenous, for instance price.  In the case that 
price is predetermined such that E (Pit νis) ≠ 0 for s < t, all relevant lagged levels of the 
predetermined variables are used to instrument for the difference, (Pit - Pit-1), following the same 
principles above.  Lagged levels of the predetermined variables (and not the current levels) also 
enter the instrumental matrix for the differenced dependent variable (LOit-1 - LOit-2).  If the drug 
price is not just predetermined but also purely endogenous such that E (Pit νis) ≠ 0 for s ≤ t, then 
the orthogonality conditions allow levels of the drug price lagged two or more periods to serve as 
                                                 
22 If the νit are not serially correlated, there is still first-order autocorrelation between the first-
differenced errors.  Thus, a test of no autocorrelation in νit translates to testing whether there is 
second-order or higher degree autocorrelation in the differenced errors.  These tests are 
presented in the results. 
23 Studies have shown that drug prices are positively correlated with the costs of distribution and 
retailing, including the relative unskilled wage and the probability of apprehension for selling or 
trafficking in various drugs.  Holding income and the arrest rate for drug possession constant, 
these variables should not affect the full price for users and thus should not affect demand.  This 
suggests that they may be used as instruments for drug prices to deal with problems of any 
measurement error or policy endogeneity.  However, in practical application, these instruments 
do not pass checks for instrumental validity in basic year-effects models since they are likely to 
be correlated with unobserved MSA-specific factors.  In models with both year and MSA effects, 
these instruments pass the test for overidentification restrictions; however they are very weak 
and not strongly correlated with drug prices in the first stage.  Since poor instruments 







instruments.  Estimating (22a) via the Arellano-Bond method allows a direct estimation of the 
addictive demand function and yields short-run and long-run estimates of the price elasticities.  It 
also provides a check for the robustness of the estimated elasticities from other specifications 
where the lagged dependent variable is proxied by lagged prices.  Furthermore, it is also 
informative to note whether the price elasticity is sensitive to treating drug prices as strictly 
exogenous versus instrumenting them. 
6. Results 
  Table 2 presents estimation of the baseline demand function for urinalysis based logistic 
cocaine and heroin use, which excludes the lagged effects.  All specifications include the drug 
price, individual and MSA-level socioeconomic covariates, year effects and then progressively 
add MSA effects and indicators for MSA-specific linear trends.  Specifications 1 through 4 
present the models for cocaine use.  Cocaine price is negative and statistically significant in all 
specifications, and the price elasticity ranges from -0.11 to -0.22.  Specification 1, which 
includes year indicators, yields an elasticity of an arrestee’s probability of recent (past 48 – 72 
hours) cocaine participation with respect to own price of -0.20.  Relative to whites, Blacks are 
more likely and arrestees of other race are less likely to use cocaine.  Hispanics are more likely 
to use cocaine relative to non-Hispanics.  Individuals ages 16 to 24 and ages 25 to 54 are also 
more likely to consume cocaine relative to older individuals.  Being married reduces the 
probability of using cocaine.  The coefficient on income is significantly positive, implying that 
health is a normal good.  The arrest rate for drug possession has a negative effect on cocaine use.  
A higher probability of apprehension raises the full price of cocaine and reduces participation; 
the elasticity is estimated at -0.09.   The coefficient of the log of the DUF arrest rate is 







year effects; here, only changes in the price of cocaine within a given MSA are relied upon for 
identification.  Each MSA serves as its own control group, with the price in one year compared 
to the prevailing price in the same MSA for another year.  The estimated price elasticity is robust 
at -0.22.  Since there are some MSA-year cells for which the arrest rates are missing, most 
subsequent specifications exclude them in order to maximize sample size.  Specification 3 shows 
that the elasticity is only negligibly affected (-0.19) by this exclusion.  Specification 4 adds 
indicators of MSA-specific linear trends.  This is a stringent test since only deviations around a 
linear trend, within each city, are used for identification.  The price effect remains significant at 
the one percent level, and the elasticity decreases in magnitude to -0.11.  The addition of MSA-
specific linear trends causes the MSA-level covariates to lose joint significance.  The largest gain 
in adjusted R-square results from the addition of MSA effects; including MSA-linear trends 
raises the adjusted R-square by a relatively small amount.  In subsequent analyses, fixed-effects 
specifications without city-specific trends are preferred and used to more reliably pin down the 
price elasticity.   
  Specifications 5 to 8 present similar models for urinalysis based logistic heroin use.  The 
estimated price coefficients are significantly negative in all cases.  Specification 5 shows the 
effects of the individual and MSA-level covariates.  These are generally similar to those 
discussed with the cocaine models.  Males participate more in heroin, and Blacks and other races 
participate less.  Arrestees who are otherwise employed full-time in the legal sector are also less 
likely to be heroin users.  MSA-level income has a small positive effect on heroin participation, 
which disappears in subsequent models.  Arrestees who have been booked on a drug-related 
charge have a higher probability of using heroin.  The probability of apprehension, as proxied by 







using heroin.  The corresponding elasticity is estimated at -0.40.  The DUF arrest rate is also 
negative and significant.  Specification 2, which adds MSA effects, yields a heroin price 
participation elasticity estimate of -0.10.  Adding MSA-specific linear trends diminishes the 
magnitude of the price elasticity to -0.05. 
  Table 3 presents separate results for drug and non-drug offenders in order to inform on 
the extent to which selection of drug offenders into the DUF arrestee sample affects the 
participation price elasticity.  Compared to individuals whose most serious charge was non-drug 
related, drug offenders were more likely to use cocaine and heroin recently and in the past 
month.  Drug-using offenders also had a higher frequency of use, consuming cocaine and heroin 
on slightly more days than non-drug offenders.  Thus arrestees booked on a drug charge appear 
to be the heaviest among the heavy users.  The price elasticities of cocaine and heroin use are 
estimated to be slightly lower for the drug offenders relative to the non-drug offenders, implying 
that heavier consumers are less price responsive.  For cocaine use, the price elasticity ranges 
from -0.12 to -0.17 (compared to -0.20 to -0.28 for non-drug offenders), and for heroin use, the 
price elasticity ranges from -0.07 to -0.15 (versus -0.14 to -0.19 for non-drug offenders).  
Specifications 5 and 6 further restrict the sample of non-drug offenders to those booked only on 
misdemeanor charges.  The cocaine price elasticity of -0.20 and the heroin price elasticity of -
0.08 are similar to those estimated for all non-drug offenders.  Furthermore, elasticities based on 
samples that exclude individuals booked on drug-related charges are highly similar to those 
based on the sample of all arrestees.  This is not surprising given that individuals arrested for a 
drug-related charge comprise only about 18 % of the total DUF sample and thus do not 
contribute much to the overall elasticity measures computed for all arrestees.  All subsequent 







  Table 4 estimates the demand function under the addiction framework, given by equation 
(19), where the addictive stock is proxied by one- and two-year lagged prices.  The 
contemporaneous prices are negative and significant in all specifications, for both cocaine and 
heroin, including those with MSA-linear trends.  The inclusion of lagged prices does not 
substantially reduce the magnitude of the current price elasticity.  The short-run cocaine price 
elasticity is estimated at -0.18, and the short-run heroin price elasticity is estimated at -0.08.  The 
elasticity of participation with respect to lagged price, holding current price constant, has a 
magnitude almost as large as the current price elasticity.  The one-year lagged cocaine price 
elasticity is about -0.15, and the two-year lagged cocaine price elasticity is about -0.14.  For 
heroin, the one-year lagged price elasticity is about -0.15, and the two-year lagged price 
elasticity is about -0.05.  The coefficients on the contemporaneous and the lagged prices can be 
used to calculate the long-run price elasticity of the probability of participating in each drug.  
The long-run price elasticity measures the full current and future effects of a change in current 
price.  For both drugs, it has a magnitude which is more than double the short-run price response, 
about -0.45 for cocaine and -0.21 for heroin.  
  Models 4 and 5 in Table 4 provide a check for policy endogeneity.  These models add the 
one-year leading price in addition to the current and lagged prices.  Significant leading price 
effects may indirectly inform on the presence of policy endogeneity or any specification bias.  
The current price effect for both cocaine and heroin use is negative and significant in all cases.  
The contemporaneous price elasticity for cocaine participation is about -0.18; for heroin, it is -
0.09.  These magnitudes are highly similar to the estimates reported above and are not sensitive 
to the inclusion of the lead prices.  The lagged prices are significant as a group in all 







run price elasticities remain robust to the inclusion of the lead prices, and current cocaine or 
heroin use does not seem to be affected by future prices. 
  Since this is not a definitive test, it would be reassuring if other specification checks also 
confirm that policy endogeneity is not likely or does not substantially alter inferences.  Table 5 
presents specifications that include lagged drug enforcement measures in order to control for any 
unobserved shocks to past drug-related outcomes that may affect current prices.  One set of 
lagged enforcement variables includes one-year lags of the arrest rate for any drug violation and 
the arrest rate for selling or trafficking in any drugs.  The second set includes one-year lags of the 
arrest rate for any drug violation, the arrest rate for selling cocaine and opiates, and the arrest rate 
for selling marijuana.  The third set includes both one- and two-year lags of the arrest rate for 
any drug violation and the arrest rate for selling or trafficking in any drugs.  The final set 
includes one- and two-year lags of the arrest rate for any drug violation, the arrest rate for selling 
cocaine and opiates, and the arrest rate for selling marijuana.   
  The top panel of Table 6 presents these results for recent cocaine use.  Specifications 1-4 
include MSA and year effects in addition to the other covariates, and specifications 5-8 also add 
MSA-specific linear trends.  The lagged enforcement variables as a group are significant in all 
models.  The cocaine price elasticity is significantly negative in all specifications and is robust to 
the inclusion of the lagged arrest rates.  It decreases only marginally and ranges from -0.10 to -
0.19. 
  The bottom panel presents the same models for recent heroin use.  Heroin price is 
negative and significant in all cases, and the lagged enforcement measures are significant in all 
but one of the models.  The price elasticity remains robust and lies between -0.08 and -0.13.  







addition of leading prices or lagged arrest rates, which may be capturing to some extent 
unobserved shocks simultaneously affecting past drug uses and price.
24 
  All of the models presented thus far have included only the relevant drug’s own price.  
Table 6 estimates the cross-price model derived in equation (20), with and without lagged prices.  
Specifications 1-4 present the models for recent cocaine use.  Current cocaine price is 
significantly negative in all models as is the one-year lagged cocaine price.  The 
contemporaneous cocaine participation own-price elasticity is estimated at -0.20.  Current heroin 
price is also negative and significant in the full fixed effects models, with a cross-price elasticity 
of -0.03.  The one-year lagged cross-price elasticity is estimated at -0.04.  This suggests that 
cocaine and heroin are not only current economic complements but also intertemporal 
complements.  This is consistent with a cross-reinforcement effect wherein past heroin 
consumption motivates current cocaine consumption by raising the current marginal utility of 
cocaine use.  Specifications 5-8 present similar models for heroin use.  The current own price 
elasticity is not affected by the inclusion of the current and lagged cocaine prices, and is 
estimated at -0.09.  The lagged heroin price effects are also significant, with a corresponding 
elasticity of about -0.17.  However, the cross price effects are imprecisely estimated in these 
models.  Symmetry of compensated cross-price effects for cocaine use and heroin use should not 
be expected because these are demand functions at the extensive margin, measuring the decision 
to participate in the consumption of a given drug.
25    
                                                 
24 The elasticities are more affected in non-fixed effects models (not shown), suggesting that the 
full fixed effects and the city-specific trends are capturing much of the variation in such factors 
and other unobserved non-contemporaneous shocks. 
25 In the case of an interior solution, symmetric cross-price effects result from Young’s theorem 
applied to a small neighborhood around a given interior point where both X and Y are 
consumed.  In the case of an exterior solution, the comparison of cross-price effects involves 







   One of the advantages of DUF is that the indicators of drug use based on urine specimens 
are objective and more accurate than self-reported indicators, which may be plagued by 
measurement errors due to misreporting.  Such inaccuracies in self-reported data may have 
biased prior estimates of the price elasticity of demand.  The extent of this measurement error 
can be gauged in DUF because arrestees were also asked to report on their own cocaine and 
heroin use in the past 72 hours.
26  Looking at the simple means, there seems to be vast under-
reporting in the self-reported data.  About 41 % of the arrestees tested positive for cocaine use 
whereas only 21 % admitted to using cocaine recently.  Over eight percent of the arrestees tested 
positive for heroin whereas only five percent admitted to its use in the last three days.  While 
most agree that survey data are plagued with misreporting, it is unknown to what degree and 
whether the misreporting is systematic.  It is likely that hardcore drug users are more likely to 
under-report, and that recent use is more likely to be under-reported than past month or past year 
use.  At least for the sample of arrestees, it can be assessed whether the elasticities and marginal 
effects are sensitive to such measurement error.  The participation-price elasticity can differ 
because of differences in mean participation as well differences in the marginal response.  
Under-reporting, by reducing the measured mean participation, results in larger magnitudes of 
the elasticity, ceteris paribus.  However, it is also likely that the marginal response may be 
different between those who accurately report drug use and those who do not.  Since the sign of 
this difference is not known a priori, this effect may either raise or lower the elasticity.   
                                                                                                                                                             
vice versa.  In the absence of requisite restrictions on the utility parameters, symmetric cross-
price effects for the participation decision are not a necessary property of such demand 
functions. 







  Table 7 presents models for both the urinalysis-based indicators of drug use and the self-
reported measures.  The top panel estimates the same logistic specification used thus far, and 
reports both the elasticity and the marginal effect for cocaine and heroin use.  Comparing the 
specifications for the objective and self-reported indicators of cocaine use, the marginal effect of 
price is somewhat larger for the urinalysis based indicators.  However, the large under-reporting 
raises the absolute elasticity.  For heroin participation, the marginal price response is not much 
different between the two sets of outcomes.  The under-reporting again causes the absolute 
magnitude of the self-reported elasticities to be larger.  The bottom panel estimates a double-log 
demand function so that the estimated price coefficient also represents the elasticity.  The price 
elasticities with respect to self-reported cocaine participation and heroin participation are again 
higher.  Overall these results suggest that self-reported data are plagued by under-reporting, 
which in the case of heavy users is likely to be substantial.  Such under-reporting tends to impart 
an upward absolute bias, yielding cocaine price elasticities that are as much as two times the 
magnitude and heroin price elasticities that are as much as three times the magnitude relative to 
those based on objective indicators.   
  Defining the percentage of arrestees in each MSA who under-report as the difference 
between the objective and the subjective participation measures, models show that the rate of 
under-reporting is significantly negatively related to the own drug’s price conditional on other 
observed covariates.  This means that the rate of under-reporting is higher in those cities with 
lower drug prices and presumably higher consumption.  This negative correlation between 
under-reporting and drug prices implies that the measurement error is systematic.  It is also 
consistent with the direction of the bias in the elasticities estimated with the self-reported data 







  Models of addiction suggest that current use is a direct and positive function of past use 
due to the reinforcement effect.  Earlier, the addictive stock was proxied by a series of past prices 
due to problems associated with including a lagged dependent variable as a regressor.  The 
significance of lagged price effects is evidence of this addiction framework.  Table 8 directly 
estimates the demand function under addiction expressed in equation (22) by the Arellano-Bond 
(A-B) procedure, which as explained in section 5 is a first-differenced instrumental variables 
estimator.
27 
  The top panel of Table 8 presents the results for logistic cocaine use.  Specifications 1-3 
exclude year effects, and specifications 4-6 include them.  The one-year lagged cocaine use is 
positive and significant at the one percent level in all models.  This is consistent with the 
addiction paradigm.  Cocaine price is negative and significant in all specifications.  Specification 
1 and 4 treat the cocaine price as strictly exogenous.  Specifications 2 and 5 treat it as a 
predetermined variable and account for an endogenous policy response.  Specifications 3 and 6 
treat the price as a pure endogenous variable and account for the simultaneity of supply and 
demand.
28  Specifications 1-3, which exclude year effects, are only presented for comparison.  
                                                 
27 Baltagi et al. (2000) estimate demand specifications for cigarettes using various dynamic 
panel-data estimators.  Also see Baltagi and Levin (1986).  Anderson and Hsiao (1981, 1982) 
discuss these estimation techniques.  Baltagi (1995) provides a good overview of these 
estimators. 
28 It is generally assumed that the U.S. supply of cocaine and heroin is infinitely elastic, that is 
suppliers are able to satisfy any market demand at the current price.  This assumption is 
invoked in virtually all empirical studies of the demand for drugs.  Cocaine and heroin are 
basically agricultural products that are inexpensive to produce and require minimal processing.  
Rhodes et al. (2001) note that cocaine, for instance, is fairly easy to transport and only about 
300 metric tons satisfy entire U.S. market demand.  The largest costs involved in producing, 
transporting, and distributing cocaine are the costs of operating in the illegal sector.  Miron 
(2001) suggests that the black market price of cocaine is as much as 5 times higher and that of 
heroin as much as 19 times higher than prices that would prevail in a legalized regime.  The 
amount of coca harvested exceeds the amount shipped by a substantial amount.  This implies 







For these models, the test of overidentifying restrictions for instrumental validity can be rejected 
at the 10 % significance level.   The instrumental matrix passes the validity check more readily in 
the models with year effects.  From these specifications, the short-run or contemporaneous 
cocaine price elasticity is estimated to be between –0.09 and –0.12.  A model with a lagged 
dependent variable can be derived from a distributed lagged model where current consumption 
depends on all past values of price and the effect of successively distant lags diminish 
geometrically.  In this case, the long-run price elasticity can be calculated as the current price 
elasticity times (1/1-δ1) where δ1 is the coefficient of lagged drug use.  It measures the total 
impact of a change in price on participation after all the lagged effects have been felt.  The long-
run cocaine price elasticity is estimated between –0.16 and –0.22.  Note that this long-run 
elasticity is much smaller than that implied from the reduced-form myopic addiction models that 
include a series of lagged prices.  The reason is that these models do not show any evidence that 
lagged prices have a substantially smaller effect than current prices, at least for the one and two-
year lags.  That is, the price coefficients are not restricted to follow a geometrically decaying 
pattern.   
  Treating the cocaine price as predetermined or endogenous and instrumenting for it does 
not substantially alter the results.  It should also be noted that there is no evidence of 
autocorrelation in any of the models; no autocorrelation in non-differenced errors is equivalent to 
no autocorrelation beyond the first order in first-differenced errors.  This is a necessary condition 
for the validity of past levels as instruments for current differences in the A-B procedure.  If 
                                                                                                                                                             
without increasing their per unit cost.  Basov, Jacobson, and Miron (2001) similarly note that the 
U.S. is also a relatively small market for opiates.  All of these considerations point to the 







policy endogeneity is interpreted as an intertemporal omitted variables bias, then it will lead to 
impure serial correlation in the disturbance term.  The lack of serial correlation suggests that 
policy endogeneity is not likely.  This is consistent with the inferences drawn from the prior 
checks for such specification bias.       
  The bottom panel of Table 8 presents similar estimation for logistic heroin use.  Lagged 
heroin use is significantly positive in all specifications.  The short-run heroin price elasticity is 
estimated to be between –0.06 and –0.11, and the long-run price elasticity is between –0.09 and –
0.17.   Overall, these results confirm the strong addictive aspects of cocaine and heroin.  
Magnitudes of the current price elasticity for heroin are very similar to those estimated in the 
earlier models with and without lagged prices.  Furthermore, the errors are non-autocorrelated, 
and explicitly treating price as a predetermined or endogenous variable does not substantially 
alter the elasticities. 
7. Conclusions 
  The objective of this study was to estimate the empirical relationship between the prices 
of cocaine and heroin and objective indicators of their use.  By employing data on cocaine and 
heroin use based on urine specimens this study bypasses any measurement errors prevalent in 
survey data due to misreporting.  The persons sampled in DUF constitute an important subgroup 
of hardcore drug users, which is often not captured by national surveys.  Since these persons are 
more likely to be serious users, impose the heaviest costs on society, and are the targets of much 
illegal drug policy, studying their addictive consumption behavior is very important from a 
public policy stance.   
                                                                                                                                                             
the more relevant consideration of policy endogeneity are directly addressed with the Arellano-







  The key conclusion that emerges from this study is that cocaine and heroin prices have a 
significantly negative effect on the probability of use for arrestees.  The elasticity estimates that 
emerge are robust in virtually all of the specifications tested.  Results from DUF indicate that the 
own-price cocaine participation elasticity ranges from -0.11 to -0.23, and the own-price heroin 
participation elasticity is between -0.07 and -0.12.  These elasticities are significantly smaller 
than those estimated in prior studies.  This is not surprising since the arrestee population is more 
likely to be addicted to drugs than the population at large and thus may be less responsive to 
price.   Indicators based on urinalysis are also more likely to pick up participation in heavy 
consumption, which may be less responsive to price.  Furthermore, the data from DUF show that 
self-reports of drug use are biased downwards, and this may impart an upward absolute bias to 
the estimated elasticities.  These elasticities are also smaller in magnitude than those obtained 
from other studies of DUF.  However, all of these other studies are plagued with specification 
errors, inadequate controls, and bias due to unmeasured factors.  The present study uses the time 
series of repeated city cross-sections to estimate full fixed-effects specifications that control for 
unmeasured factors, policy endogeneity, and simultaneity.  It also adds to the limited literature 
on cross-price elasticities; the results suggest that cocaine and heroin are likely economic 
complements.
29  The results also show the presence of significantly negative own and cross-price 
effects but insignificant lead-price effects.   
  The contemporaneous elasticity understates the full effect, since the long-run price 
elasticity is about twice the magnitude.  In a fixed population of arrestees, the elasticity estimates 
from this study imply that a 10 % increase in the current price of cocaine in the U.S. will prevent 







future periods.  A corresponding increase in heroin price will prevent about 7,093 arrestees from 
consuming heroin in the current period and deter an additional 14,840 arrestees subsequently.
30  
Approximately 13.8 % of cocaine and heroin users consume both drugs.  Taking multiple users 
into account, a 10 % increase in cocaine and heroin price will thus deter approximately 165,842 
arrestees from using drugs.  Total societal costs from drug abuse were estimated at $160.7 billion 
for 2000 (ONDCP, 2001).  In the Drug Abuse Warning Network, about 46 % of all hospital 
emergency department drug-related episodes involved cocaine or heroin in 2000.
31  Applying 
this proxy share for health-related costs, total costs from cocaine and heroin abuse amount to 
approximately $73.9 billion.  For that same year, there were a total of 13.8 million federal, state, 
and local arrests in the U.S.  About 30.5 % of the DUF sample tested positive for either cocaine 
or heroin, or both.  Ignoring multiple arrests in a year, this implies that there were approximately 
4.2 million cocaine or heroin using arrestees in 2000.  Assuming that these drug abusing 
arrestees are fully responsible for all of the costs from drug abuse, the social cost of one such 
drug user is $17,539.
32  Thus a 10 % increase in both cocaine and heroin prices will reduce social 
costs by $2.9 billion.  Simple time-series estimates and prior studies suggest that a 10 % increase 
in drug prices requires an increase in total drug control spending of at least $2 - $3 billion or 
                                                                                                                                                             
29 This is consistent with the studies by Saffer and Chaloupka (1996a, 1996b) and Dave (2004). 
30 These estimates are based on Table 4 and the total number of arrests (13,814,843) and 
arrestee drug prevalence in 2000.  If the cross-price effects are negative, then more arrestees 
will be deterred from using cocaine and/or heroin.  It is also assumed that increases in drug 
prices do not affect arrests.  If enforcement efforts that raise the price of drugs also raise the 
total number of arrests, then less arrestees will be deterred from drug participation. 
31 This is likely an overestimate because episodes may involve multiple drugs.  For instance, 
only 28 % of cocaine episodes involved solely cocaine.  See Dave (2004). 
32 Rhodes and McDonald estimated that the sample represented in DUF accounts for as much 







between $12,060 to $18,090 per deterred user.
33  Thus, it is not readily apparent that further 
enforcement and interdiction driven increases in drug prices are necessarily cost-efficient.  The 
share of law enforcement has steadily risen from 36 % to 53 % over the past 15 years.  In 
contrast, resources allocated towards shifting demand, such as treatment and prevention, have 
remained stable at only about one-third of the total budget over this period.  Requisite caveats 
notwithstanding, the low magnitudes of the participation price elasticity suggest that a more 
demand-driven drug control policy may well be worth considering in future allocation of the 
drug control budget.
34  
                                                 
33 Total drug control spending in the U.S. amounted to $35 billion in 2000.  Miron (2001) 
estimates that the black market price of cocaine is about 4 times larger and that of heroin is 
about 14 times larger than the price in a legal market.  A crude extrapolation implies that an 
increase in the drug control budget of $2 - $3 billion will raise the price of both drugs by about 
10 %.  Time series regressions of cocaine and heroin prices on total drug control spending, after 
accounting for linear and quadratic trends, suggest a similar increase in spending of $2 billion. 
34 This analysis does not consider the price response at the intensive margin.  However, prior 
studies have shown that the consumption elasticity for users is a very small share of the total 
price response.  See Grossman et al. (2002).  Models estimated on the DUF sample, based on 
self-reported past month participation and frequency, confirm this result.  Saffer, Chaloupka, 
and Dave (2001) also suggest that a reallocation of resources from criminal justice to drug 
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Drug Use Forecasting System 
 Sample Means 
Variable Definition  Mean 
Recent Cocaine Use 
Urinalysis 
Percent of arrestees in each MSA whose urine tested positive for cocaine use in 
the past 48 – 72 hours 
0.3976 
(0.1374) 
Logistic Recent Cocaine 
Use Urinalysis 
Log of the odds of recent cocaine use urinalysis  -0.4587 
(0.6312) 
Recent Heroin Use 
Urinalysis 
Percent of arrestees in each MSA whose urine tested positive for opiate use in 
the past 48 – 72 hours 
0.0827 
(0.0585) 
Logistic Recent Heroin 
Use Urinalysis 
Log of the odds of recent heroin use urinalysis  -2.6622 
(0.8136) 
Recent Cocaine Use 
Self-Report 




Logistic Recent Cocaine 
Use Self-Report 
Log of the odds of recent cocaine use self-report  -1.3833 
(0.5286) 
Recent Heroin Use Self-
Report 
Percent of arrestees in each MSA who reported using heroin in the past 72 hours  0.0505 
(0.0476) 
Logistic Recent Heroin 
Use Self-Report 
Log of the odds of recent heroin use self-report  -3.4140 
(1.1522) 
Past Month Cocaine Use  Percent of arrestees in each MSA who reported using cocaine in the past 30 days  0.2803 
(0.0902) 
Logistic Past Month 
Cocaine Use 
Log of the odds of past month cocaine use  -0.9920 
(0.4763) 
Past Month Heroin Use  Percent of arrestees in each MSA who reported using heroin in the past 30 days  0.0641 
(0.0548) 
Logistic Past Month 
Heroin Use 
Log of the odds of past month heroin use  -3.0819 
(1.0485) 
Frequency Past Month 
Cocaine Use 
Mean number of days in each MSA that cocaine was used in the past 30 days, 
conditional on users 
23.2946 
(4.5912) 
Log Frequency Past 
Month Cocaine Use 
Log of frequency past month cocaine use  3.1281 
(0.2040) 
Frequency Past Month 
Heroin Use 
Mean number of days in each MSA that heroin was used in the past 30 days, 
conditional on users 
17.0798 
(4.3605) 
Log Frequency Past 
Month Heroin Use 
Log of frequency past month heroin use  2.7862 
(0.3798) 








Male  Percent of arrestees in each MSA who are male  0.7586 
(0.1174) 
Black  Percent of arrestees in each MSA who are black  0.5152 
(0.2592) 
Other Race  Percent of arrestees in each MSA who are of a race other than white or black  0.0248 
(0.0529) 
Hispanic  Percent of arrestees in each MSA who are Hispanic  0.1628 
(0.1792) 
Age 16-24  Percent of arrestees in each MSA who are between the ages of 16 through 24  0.3338 
(0.0571) 
Age 25-54  Percent of arrestees in each MSA who are between the ages of 25 through 54  0.6495 
(0.0567) 








Full-Time Employment  Percent of arrestees in each MSA whose main source of income in the past 30 
days was from full-time employment 
0.3901 
(0.0998) 
Married  Percent of arrestees in each MSA who are married  0.1597 
(0.0522) 




MSA Income  Per capita personal income in each MSA, divided by the annual national 
consumer price index  
16.8784 
(2.6015) 
MSA Unemployment  Unemployment rate in each MSA  0.0544 
(0.0208) 




Log DUF Arrest Rate  Natural logarithm of DUF Arrest Rate  -4.7746 
(0.8132) 
Drug Possession Arrest 
Rate 
Percent of arrests in each MSA resulting from any drug sale or trafficking  0.0777 
(0.0367) 
Drug Violation Arrest 
Rate 




Drug Sale Arrest Rate  Total number of arrests in each MSA due to any drug sale or trafficking divided 
by MSA population 
0.0014 
(0.0012) 
Cocaine Sale Arrest Rate  Total number of arrests in each MSA due to cocaine sale or trafficking divided 
by MSA population 
0.0008 
(0.0010) 
Marijuana Sale Arrest 
Rate 
Total number of arrests in each MSA due to marijuana sale or trafficking 
divided by MSA population 
0.0003 
(0.0002) 
Population  Total MSA population  2978176 
(2369104) 
Observations  332 
Notes:  Standard deviations are in parentheses.  Number of observations listed represents the maximum 








Logistic Cocaine & Heroin Use 
Baseline Models  
Dependent Variable  Logistic Recent Cocaine Use  Logistic Recent Heroin Use 
Specification  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Own Price 
(Cocaine / Heroin) 
-0.00425*** 
(-4.27) 
ε = -0.204 
-0.00452*** 
(-5.68) 
ε = -0.217 
-0.00399*** 
(-5.01) 
ε = -0.192 
-0.00231*** 
(-3.36) 
ε = -0.111 
-0.00030** 
(-2.11) 
ε = -0.134 
-0.00022*** 
(-2.66) 
ε = -0.098 
-0.00025*** 
(-2.81) 
ε = -0.112 
-0.00011* 
(-1.61) 
















































































































































Yes No Yes  -5.67362*** 
(-4.11) 
Yes No Yes 
DUF Arrest Rate  -0.07976** 
(-2.10) 
Yes No Yes  -0.19246*** 
(-3.35) 
Yes*** No  Yes** 
Year Effects  Yes***  Yes***  Yes***  Yes*** Yes** Yes***  Yes***  Yes*** 
MSA Effects  No  Yes***  Yes***  Yes*** No Yes***  Yes***  Yes*** 
MSA-Linear  Trend  No No No  Yes***  No No No  Yes*** 
R-Squared 0.698  0.889  0.868  0.940 0.536 0.887 0.868 0.932 
Observations  300 300 322 300 281 281 301 281 
Notes:  All estimates are from weighted regressions.  Dependent variable is log(A/1-A) where A is the percentage of arrestees in each MSA testing positive for cocaine or heroin use.  T-ratios 
are in parentheses.   *** significant at 1 percent   ** significant at 5 percent    * significant at 10 percent.  Elasticities are reported where the own-price coefficient is significant at 10 percent or 







 Table  3   
Logistic Cocaine & Heroin Use 
Restricted Samples  
 
Dependent Variable  Logistic Recent Cocaine Use 
Sample  Drug Offenders  Non-Drug Offenders  Non-Drug Misdemeanor 
Offenders 
Specification  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Cocaine Price  -0.00330*** 
(-2.50) 
ε = -0.122 
-0.00452*** 
(-3.97) 
ε = -0.167 
-0.00548*** 
(-5.93) 
ε = -0.276 
-0.00404*** 
(-4.90) 
ε = -0.204 
-0.00606*** 
(-6.22) 
ε = -0.302 
-0.00406*** 
(-4.01) 
ε = -0.202 
Individual / MSA 
Covariates 
Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
Year  Effects  Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
MSA  Effects  No Yes*** No Yes*** No Yes*** 
R-Squared  0.512 0.795 0.695 0.862 0.741 0.853 
Observations  321 321 322 322 320 321 
Recent Cocaine Use 
- Urinalysis 
0.538 0.368 0.375 
Recent Cocaine Use 
- Self Report 
0.314 0.191 0.204 
Past Month Cocaine 
Use - Self Report 
0.394 0.255 0.263 
Frequency Past 
Month Cocaine Use 
- Self Report 
24.1 23.1 23.0 
 
 
Dependent Variable  Logistic Recent Heroin Use 
Sample  Drug Offenders  Non-Drug Offenders  Non-Drug Misdemeanor 
Offenders 
Specification  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Heroin Price  -0.00034** 
(-1.66) 
ε = -0.147 
-0.00017* 
(-1.34) 
ε = -0.073 
-0.00043*** 
(-2.94) 
ε = -0.194 
-0.00030*** 
(-3.25) 
ε = -0.135 
-0.00053*** 
(-3.77) 
ε = -0.237 
-0.00018*** 
(-2.05) 
ε = -0.081 
Individual / MSA 
Covariates 
Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
Year  Effects  Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
MSA  Effects  No Yes*** No Yes*** No Yes*** 
R-Squared  0.271 0.805 0.492 0.847 0.578 0.848 
Observations  295 295 301 301 288 288 
Recent Heroin Use - 
Urinalysis 
0.113 0.075 0.078 
Recent Heroin Use - 
Self-Report 
0.074 0.045 0.044 
Past Month Heroin 
Use - Self Report 
0.090 0.058 0.057 
Frequency Past 
Month Heroin Use - 
Self-Report 
18.0 16.9 16.6 
Notes: All estimates are from weighted regressions.  Dependent variable is log(A/1-A) where A is the percentage of arrestees in each 
MSA testing positive for cocaine or heroin use.  T-ratios are in parentheses.   *** significant at 1 percent   ** significant at 5 percent    * 
significant at 10 percent.  Elasticities are reported where the own-price coefficient is significant at 10 percent or less in a one-tailed test.  
Individual/MSA covariates include: male, black, other race, Hispanic, age 16-24, age 25-54, high school graduate, full-time 








Logistic Cocaine & Heroin Use 
Lagged & Leading Prices 
 
Dependent Variable  Logistic Recent Cocaine Use 
Specification  1 2 3 4 5 
Cocaine Price  -0.00454*** 
(-3.95) 
ε = -0.220 
-0.00362*** 
(-4.47) 
ε = -0.175 
-0.00190*** 
(-2.85) 
ε = -0.092 
-0.00371*** 
(-4.35) 
ε = -0.180 
-0.00359*** 
(-4.23) 
ε = -0.174 




ε = -0.116 
-0.00301*** 
(-3.85) 
ε = -0.151 
-0.00092* 
(-1.37) 
ε = -0.046 
-0.00322*** 
(-3.69) 
ε = -0.162 
-0.00287*** 
(-3.29) 
ε = -0.144 














ε = -0.111 
1 Year Leading 
Cocaine Price 
No No No Yes  Yes 
Long Run Elasticity  -0.333  -0.445  -0.137  -0.336  -0.414 
Individual / MSA 
Covariates 
Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
Year Effects  Yes***  Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
MSA  Effects  No  Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
MSA-Linear Trend  No  No  Yes***  No  No 
R-Squared  0.679 0.879 0.929 0.878 0.880 
 
 
Dependent Variable  Logistic Recent Heroin Use 
Specification  1 2 3 4 5 
Heroin Price  -0.00027* 
(-1.58) 
ε = -0.121 
-0.00017** 
(-1.89) 
ε = -0.076 
-0.00012** 
(-1.75) 
ε = -0.054 
-0.00020** 
(-2.24) 
ε = -0.090 
-0.00016** 
(-1.83) 
ε = -0.072 




ε = -0.164 
-0.00030*** 
(-3.92) 
ε = -0.159 
-0.00029*** 
(-4.67) 
ε = -0.154 
-0.00028*** 
(-3.47) 
ε = -0.149 
-0.00024*** 
(-3.02) 
ε = -0.127 














1 Year Leading 
Heroin Price 
No No No Yes  Yes 
Long Run Elasticity  -0.261  -0.211  -0.220  -0.216  -0.180 
Individual / MSA 
Covariates 
Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
Year Effects  Yes**  Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
MSA  Effects  No  Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
MSA-Linear Trend  No  No  Yes***  No  No 
R-Squared  0.460 0.879 0.942 0.887 0.892 
Notes: All estimates are from weighted regressions.  Dependent variable is log(A/1-A) where A is the percentage of arrestees in each 
MSA testing positive for cocaine or heroin use.  T-ratios are in parentheses.   *** significant at 1 percent   ** significant at 5 percent    * 
significant at 10 percent.  Elasticities are reported where the own-price coefficient is significant at 10 percent or less in a one-tailed test.  
Individual/MSA covariates include: male, black, other race, Hispanic, age 16-24, age 25-54, high school graduate, full-time 








Logistic Cocaine and Heroin Use 
With Lagged Enforcement Measures 
 
Specification  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Dependent Variable  Logistic Recent Cocaine Use 
Cocaine Price  -0.00393*** 
(-4.56) 
ε = -0.191 
-0.00381*** 
(-4.51) 
ε = -0.185 
-0.00340*** 
(-3.68) 
ε = -0.165 
-0.00340*** 
(-3.81) 
ε = -0.165 
-0.00244*** 
(-2.97) 
ε = -0.118 
-0.00236*** 
(-2.91) 
ε = -0.114 
-0.00228*** 
(-2.55) 
ε = -0.111 
-0.00208** 
(-2.33) 
ε = -0.101 
Individual / MSA 
Covariates 
Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
Lagged Enforcement   Group 1***  Group 2***  Group3***  Group 4***  Group 1***  Group 2***  Group3***  Group 4*** 
Year  Effects  Yes***  Yes***  Yes***  Yes***  Yes** Yes** Yes** Yes** 
MSA Effects  Yes***  Yes***  Yes***  Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
MSA-Linear  Trend  No No No No  Yes***  Yes***  Yes***  Yes*** 
R-Squared  0.889 0.892 0.897 0.901 0.936 0.939 0.937 0.940 
Dependent Variable  Logistic Recent Heroin Use 
Heroin Price  -0.00029*** 
(-2.92) 
ε = -0.130 
-0.00025*** 
(-2.49) 
ε = -0.112 
-0.00029*** 
(-2.76) 
ε = -0.130 
-0.00026*** 
(-2.44) 
ε = -0.117 
-0.00021** 
(-2.26) 
ε = -0.094 
-0.00020** 
(-2.08) 
ε = -0.090 
-0.00018** 
(-1.67) 
ε = -0.081 
-0.00017* 
(-1.51) 
ε = -0.076 
Individual / MSA 
Covariates 
Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***  Yes**  Yes*  Yes  Yes 
Lagged Enforcement   Group 1***  Group 2***  Group3***  Group 4***  Group 1**  Group 2*  Group3**  Group 4 
Year Effects  Yes***  Yes***  Yes***  Yes***  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
MSA Effects  Yes***  Yes***  Yes***  Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
MSA-Linear  Trend  No No No No  Yes***  Yes***  Yes***  Yes*** 
R-Squared  0.899 0.900 0.901 0.903 0.935 0.935 0.934 0.932 
Notes: All estimates are from weighted regressions.  Dependent variable is log(A/1-A) where A is the percentage of arrestees in each MSA testing positive for 
cocaine or heroin use.  T-ratios are in parentheses.  *** significant at 1 percent  ** significant at 5 percent  * significant at 10 percent.  Group 1 enforcement 
variables are: lagged one year drug violation arrest rate and drug sale arrest rate.  Group 2 enforcement variables are: lagged one year drug violation arrest rate and 
cocaine/heroin sale arrest rate.  Group 3 enforcement variables are: lagged one year drug violation arrest rate and marijuana sale arrest rate.  Group 4 enforcement 
variables are: one and two year lagged drug violation arrest rate and cocaine/heroin sale arrest rate.  Elasticities are reported where the own-price coefficient is 
significant at 10 percent or less in a one-tailed test.  Individual/MSA covariates include: male, black, other race, Hispanic, age 16-24, age 25-54, high school 









Logistic Cocaine and Heroin Use 
Cross Prices 
 
Dependent Variable  Logistic Recent Cocaine Use  Logistic Recent Heroin Use 
Specification  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Cocaine Price   -0.00635*** 
(-5.52) 
ε = -0.305 
-0.00540*** 
(-4.23) 
ε = -0.259 
-0.00479*** 
(-5.19) 
ε = -0.230 
-0.00413***
(-4.61) 

















ε = -0.035 
-0.00009* 
(-1.75) 
ε = -0.026 
-0.00037***
(-2.27) 
ε = -0.165 
-0.00026* 
(-1.50) 
ε = -0.116 
-0.00026*** 
(-2.95) 
ε = -0.116 
-0.00021*** 
(-2.35) 
ε = -0.094 




















ε = -0.044 
_ -0.00032** 
(-2.26) 
ε = -0.164 
_ -0.00033*** 
(-4.35) 
ε = -0.169 
Individual / MSA 
Covariates 
Yes*** Yes*** Yes***  Yes  Yes*** Yes*** Yes***  Yes 
Year  Effects  Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*  Yes* Yes***  Yes*** 
MSA  Effects  No  No Yes***  Yes*** No  No Yes***  Yes*** 
R-Squared  0.671 0.680 0.870 0.881 0.452 0.459 0.868 0.878 
Notes: All estimates are from weighted regressions.  Dependent variable is log(A/1-A) where A is the percentage of arrestees in each MSA testing positive for 
cocaine or heroin use.  T-ratios are in parentheses.  *** significant at 1 percent  ** significant at 5 percent  * significant at 10 percent.  Group 1 enforcement 
variables are: lagged one year drug violation arrest rate and drug sale arrest rate.  Group 2 enforcement variables are: lagged one year drug violation arrest rate and 
cocaine/heroin sale arrest rate.  Group 3 enforcement variables are: lagged one year drug violation arrest rate and marijuana sale arrest rate.  Group 4 enforcement 
variables are: one and two year lagged drug violation arrest rate and cocaine/heroin sale arrest rate.  Elasticities are reported where the own-price coefficient is 
significant at 10 percent or less in a one-tailed test.  Individual/MSA covariates include: male, black, other race, Hispanic, age 16-24, age 25-54, high school 








Cocaine and Heroin Use 
Urinalysis vs. Self-Report 
 
Logistic Recent Cocaine Use  Logistic Recent Heroin Use  Dependent 
Variable  Urinalysis Self-Report Urinalysis Self-Report Urinalysis Self-Report Urinalysis Self-Report 
Specification 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
Cocaine Price   -0.00529*** 
(-5.22) 
ME = -0.0013 
ε = -0.248 
-0.00564*** 
(-5.15) 
ME = -0.0009 
ε = -0.353 
-0.00365*** 
(-4.22) 
ME = -0.0009 




ε = -0.236 
-0.00044*** 
(-2.62) 
ME = -.00003  
ε = -0.196 
-0.00061*** 
(-2.65) 
ME = -.00003  
ε = -0.282 
-0.00019** 
(-2.09) 
ME = -.00001 
ε = -0.085 
-0.00042** 
(-2.21) 
ME = -.00002 
ε = -0.194 
Individual / MSA 
Covariates 
Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
Year Effects  Yes***  Yes  Yes***  Yes*** Yes  Yes***  Yes***  Yes** 
MSA Effects  No  No  Yes***  Yes***  No  No  Yes***  Yes*** 
R-Squared  0.656 0.550 0.869 0.810 0.463  0.515  0.879  0.766 
 
 
Log Recent Cocaine Use  Log Recent Heroin Use  Dependent 
Variable  Urinalysis Self-Report Urinalysis Self-Report Urinalysis Self-Report Urinalysis Self-Report 



















Individual / MSA 
Covariates 
Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
Year  Effects Yes*** Yes Yes***  Yes*** Yes  Yes* Yes**  Yes** 
MSA  Effects  No  No Yes***  Yes*** No  No Yes***  Yes*** 
R-Squared  0.641 0.529 0.857 0.728 0.444 0.521 0.876 0.772 
Notes:  All estimates are from weighted regressions.  Dependent variable is log(A/1-A) where A is the percentage of arrestees in each MSA testing positive for 
cocaine use or heroin use (urinalysis) or the percentage of arrestees in each MSA reporting positive cocaine or heroin use in the past 72 hours (self-report).  T-
ratios are in parentheses.  *** significant at 1 percent  ** significant at 5 percent  * significant at 10 percent.  Group 1 enforcement variables are: lagged one-year 
drug violation arrest rate and drug sale arrest rate.  Group 2 enforcement variables are: lagged one-year drug violation arrest rate, cocaine/heroin sale arrest rate, 
and marijuana sale arrest rate.  Group 3 enforcement variables are: lagged one- and two-year drug violation arrest rate and drug sale arrest rate.  Group 4 
enforcement variables are: lagged one- and two-year drug violation arrest rate, cocaine/heroin sale arrest rate, and marijuana sale arrest rate. Elasticities are 
reported where the own-price coefficient is significant at 10 percent or less in a one-tailed test.  Individual/MSA covariates include: male, black, other race, 








Logistic Cocaine and Heroin Use 
Arellano – Bond Estimation 
 
Dependent Variable  Logistic Recent Cocaine Use 
Specification  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Lagged 1 Year 













Cocaine Price   -0.00413*** 
(-3.41) 
SR ε = -0.198 
LR ε = -0.306 
-0.00433*** 
(-5.65) 
SR ε = -0.207 
LR ε = -0.320 
-0.00477*** 
(-5.69) 
SR ε = -0.228 
LR ε = -0.349 
-0.00186** 
(-1.97) 
SR ε = -0.089 
LR ε = -0.163 
-0.00244*** 
(-2.66) 
SR ε = -0.117 
LR ε = -0.210 
-0.00252*** 
(-2.32) 
SR ε = -0.121 
LR ε = -0.219 
Year  Effects  No  No  No Yes Yes Yes 
Cocaine Price Treatment  Exogenous  Predetermined Endogenous  Exogenous  Predetermined Endogenous 
Sargan Overidentification 
Test 
0.060 0.090 0.057 0.266 
 
0.172 0.121 
AR(1)  Test  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2)  Test  0.186 0.187 0.165 0.436 0.334 0.324 
 
Dependent Variable  Logistic Recent Heroin Use 
Specification  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Lagged 1 Year 













Cocaine Price   -0.00015* 
(-1.60) 
SR ε = -0.065 
LR ε = -0.083 
-0.00023*** 
(-2.63) 
SR ε = -0.100 
LR ε = -0.156 
-0.00026*** 
(-2.78) 
SR ε = -0.113 
LR ε = -0.166 
-0.00014* 
(-1.35) 
SR ε = -0.061 
LR ε = -0.087 
-0.00022** 
(-2.29) 
SR ε = -0.096 
LR ε = -0.161 
-0.00025*** 
(-2.33) 
SR ε = -0.109 
LR ε = -0.173 
Year  Effects  No  No  No Yes Yes Yes 
Cocaine Price Treatment  Exogenous  Predetermined Endogenous  Exogenous  Predetermined Endogenous 
Sargan Overidentification 
Test 
0.000 0.152 0.105 0.000 0.209 0.135 
AR(1)  Test  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2)  Test  0.141 0.141 0.124 0.220 0.187 0.170 
Notes: Dependent variable is log(A/1-A) where A is the percentage of arrestees in each MSA testing positive for cocaine or heroin use.  Z-values are in 
parentheses.  *** significant at 1 percent  ** significant at 5 percent  * significant at 10 percent.  Elasticities are reported where the own-price coefficient is 
significant at 10 percent or less in a one-tailed test.  Individual/MSA covariates include: male, black, other race, Hispanic, age 16-24, age 25-54, high school 
graduate, full-time employment, married, MSA income, and MSA unemployment.   